Let us define the intuitionistic part of a classical theory T as the intuitionistic theory whose proper axioms are identical with the proper axioms of T. For example, Heyting arithmetic HA is the intuitionistic part of classical Peano arithmetic PA. It's a well-known fact, proved by Heyting and Myhill, that ZF is identical with its intuitionistic part. In this paper, we mainly prove that TT, Russell's Simple Theory of Types, and NF, Quine's ''New Foundations,'' are not equal to their intuitionistic part. So, an intuitionistic version of TT or NF seems more naturally definable than an intuitionistic Version of ZF. In the first section, we present a simple technique to build Kripke models of the intuitionistic part of TT (with short examples showing bad properties of finite sets if they are defined in the usual classical way). In the remaining sections, we show how models of intuitionistic NF2 and NF can be obtained from well-chosen classical ones. In these models, the excluded middle ... http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. It's a well-known fact, proved by Heyting and Myhill, that ZF is identical with its intuitionistic part. In this paper, we mainly prove that TT, Russell's Simple Theory of Types, and NF, Quine's "New Foundations," are not equal to their intuitionistic part. So, an intuitionistic version of TT or NF seems more naturally definable than an intuitionistic version of ZF.
* for each k C K, 4'k = KN2, k, ... ; CZ", Ok=k) is a classical STT-structure, except that the equality relation =k does not need to be standard; * as usually in Kripke structures, Xk C XI whenever k ( 1 (Xk C .4r' means that the domain and relations of JXk are respectively included in the domain and relations of AX; it does not mean that Xk is a substructure of AI). We want X to be a model of intuitionistic TT. It is easy to check that 4' is indeed a Kripke structure (.'k c XI, when k < 1), and that 4' satisfies the axioms of equality.
So let (K,
It is worth noting that, for a given 4', X is totally characterized by No. It is also easy to prove the following Definability Lemma. 1.3. Application: a short study of finiteness. In this section, we plan to demonstrate how the technique described above can be used to show that the usual definition of finiteness in classical TT satisfies some "bad properties" in intuitionistic TT.
Finite sets in intuitionistic TT. As in classical TT, we define Fin2 as nf{E2 E2 is inductive}, i.e., the smallest inductive set of type 2, where a set E2 is inductive if and only if 0l E E2 and (Vxl E E2)(Vy0)(xI U {y0} E E2) (in an intuitionistic framework, it may be useful to state precisely that 01 = {xO -(xo = x0)}, and {y0} = {x0 | xI = y0}). As expected, the following induction principle can then be proved in intuitionistic TT:
(1) [ where a is the function {(0, 0), (a, 0)}, and each ai is the function {(a, i)}. From NO, define Xr in Xf as described in section 1.2. So NO -{a} and N2 = NO; in NOO and N2, the equality is standard. On the other hand, it is harder to check that V IHo V f Fin. Here are the main steps of the proof. In AX, there exists a set Y such that
AdF (1VE)(E cz-(EGN') A (VkGK)(IE(k) Ic<)).
Define F c N2 to be the function such that, for all k c K, F(k) = i. (2) We defined our models XI within models AX of ZF. We could have chosen another set theory than ZF. The main requirement is that AX must satisfy a comprehension schema strong enough to prove Theorem 2. In particular, Id could be a model of classical TT. Nevertheless, for the construction to work in that case, one has to be careful with types. (as above).
First prove that IV I -o (F is inductive). So IV I -o (Fin
Notice that, to be able to use the induction hypothesis, V must belong to X; that is why I is required to be closed under subformula. We want to build a Kripke model of intuitionistic NF2. Of course, we do not want a degenerated Kripke model which would appear to be equivalent to a classical model! The model we are going to exhibit satisfies the excluded middle for 2-stratified formula. But we shall also explicitly give a sentence a, which is not 2-stratified and such that a V -a is not satisfied in the model.
The idea is simple. Take two classical models A0 and AX1, for the language of NF. If A0 C X'1, this pair of models can be used to define a Kripke model: ,1},({,   1}, ,0) More precisely, we shall find a sentence a V -10a which is (of course) satisfied in the "classical" structure A0 / A0, but not in A0 / #1. This sentence is necessarily not 2-stratified. X0 and X1l will be obtained from shifting models of TT2. , if (A'0o /7 X1) 1Fo -v, then, in particular, (A0 / X'1) W" .  But, as in (5), this is equivalent to X1i X' a, which is absurd. So (A0 / A'1) ]Zo v From all this we conclude that (A0 / f1 ) ko a V v.
H
We have just proved that if classical NF is consistent, then intuitionistic NF does not prove the excluded middle (at least for non-stratified formulae). It is not known whether the consistency of intuitionistic NF implies the consistency of classical NF: for example, it seems that to find some double negation interpretation of classical NF into intuitionistic NF is much more difficult than for theories as PA/HA, ZF or TT: as the universe of NF is not well-founded, the constructions by induction used for ZF (see [11] ) or TT (see [8] and [10]) cannot be reproduced.
Nevertheless, Thomas Forster pointed out to me the following easy remark.
COROLLARY 9. If intuitionistic NFis consistent, then it does not prove the excluded middle (for non-stratifiedformulk).
PROOF. Suppose that intuitionistic NF is consistent, and suppose it proves the excluded middle (for all formula, including formula where some variables occur free). Then (intuitionistic NF + excluded middle) is consistent. In other words, this means that classical NF is consistent. So, by Proposition 8, intuitionistic NF does not prove the excluded middle. This is absurd and proves that intuitionistic NF does not proves the excluded middle, under the hypothesis that it is consistent. H 
